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The Blind Arhat and the Old Baby: 
Liberation by Wisdom,  
the Dry-Insight Practitioner, and the 
Pairing of Calm and Insight  
 David V. Fiordalis ∗ 
Introduction: Charting a Path through the Manifold 
Dichotomies 
In a series of articles published nearly a century ago, Louis 
de La Vallée Poussin (1929, 1937a, 1937b) drew attention to what he 
considered to be two distinct and opposing “tendencies” or 
“theories” in classical Buddhism about how to achieve the ultimate 
goal of the path, one primarily through an “intellectual” or 
“rational” apprehension of a certain body of truths, and the other 
through “ascetic” or what he also called “ecstatic” or “mystical” 
practices. He sketched the former broadly as including an emphasis 
on “wisdom” (P: paññå; Skt: prajñå), “insight” (vipassanå/ 
vipaßyanå), “seeing the truths” (satyadarßana), and “application of 
the Dhamma” (dhammayoga). The latter he saw as emphasizing 
“concentration” (samådhi), “calm abiding” (samatha/ßamatha), 
“absorption” (jhåna/dhyåna), “meditative attainment” (samåpatti), 
“extraordinary knowledge and powers” (abhiññå/abhijñå), and 
other “meditative” achievements. In this way, he sought to map a 
general dichotomy onto classical Buddhism. He also thought this 
basic dichotomy manifested itself in a number of different tensions 
that he saw as dividing the Buddhist tradition, mainly between 
(theoretical or textual or rational or intellectual) study (or insight) 
and practice (mainly of meditation, but also asceticism). He 
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surmised that these tendencies or theories also represented opposing 
conceptions of the ultimate goal itself, and that perhaps they even 
led to the development of rival factions or “schools” within the 
Buddhist tradition, and he drew a number of other conclusions Luis 
Gómez (1999 : 693) has described as “unsubstantiated” and “at best 
questionable.”   
In many ways, the distinction between calm (ßamatha) and 
insight (vipaßyanå) has shaped contemporary descriptions of (and 
prescriptions for) Buddhist practice, including meditation practice, 
and the ostensibly related dichotomies continue to influence 
modern scholarly understandings of Buddhist doctrine, theory, and 
history. For example, building on La Vallée Poussin (1937a) and 
even including a translation into English of the first few paragraphs 
of his essay, Richard Gombrich (1996 : 96) published an article 
exploring what he calls “the idea that Enlightenment can be 
attained without meditation, by a process of intellectual analysis 
(technically known as paññå, insight) alone.” But is it really 
accurate to say that any Buddhists have maintained at any time that 
“Enlightenment can be attained without meditation”? Is this what 
the Påli Buddhist sources mean by “liberation through wisdom” 
(paññåvimutti)? For one practitioner’s viewpoint, albeit 
representing a different Buddhist tradition from the one mainly 
discussed by Gombrich, no less significant a contemporary 
Buddhist voice than the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (1994: 114), 
says at the start of his brief comments on the ninth chapter of the 
Bodhicaryåvatåra (on prajñå): “In order to realize emptiness, we 
do not actually need the first five påramitås, and they are not even 
essential for developing clear insight for vipashyanå.” Now, the 
Dalai Lama does not explicitly say here that “Enlightenment can be 
attained without meditation,” but he does suggest that one need not 
perfect the virtue of meditation (or the other perfect virtues) in 
order to “develop clear insight” or “realize emptiness.” What does 
this mean? 
It seems that the nature of the distinction between calm and 
insight, how these concepts relate to one other, the broader 
implications of this distinction for Buddhist understandings of 
meditation and its place on the path, and how this distinction 
relates to other paired concepts that have been connected to it, such 
as the theory/practice dichotomy, the dichotomy between textual 
study and meditation practice, the dichotomy between “forest 
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monk” (the virtuoso ascetic) and the “town monk” (the ordinary 
ritualist),1 and other dichotomies: all these remain open questions 
that continue to interest both scholars and practitioners alike. The 
list of scholars to follow in La Vallée Poussin’s footsteps is long 
and includes many prominent voices in the history of Buddhist and 
Indian Studies.2 Some scholars, such as Gombrich or Paul Griffiths, 
have supported or extended La Vallée Poussin’s conclusions; other 
scholars like Gómez have disagreed, but still affirmed the value of 
investigating these issues.3 I offer this essay as a contribution to 
this ongoing conversation.4  
                                                           
1  On this distinction between monks of the forest and those of the town, see, for 
instance, Strong 2015: 210-212. The terms given in parentheses here are 
used by Collins 1998: 37. 
2  In lieu of providing such a list here myself, I would note that Wen 2009 
includes a useful review of some prior scholarship. Though by no means 
comprehensive, he helpfully classifies scholarly views into several groups, 
but strangely (to my mind) lumps together all those who, he says, see calm 
and insight as representing “separate” or “contradictory” soteriological 
“approaches,” without really engaging their specific arguments (11-15). 
After completing the final draft of this essay, I became aware of Anålayo 
2018 and Wynne 2018, which contain many more references to arguments 
on both sides of this debate, and bring the discussion up to a more current 
period. As will be apparent, my essay discusses some of the same primary 
sources the proper interpretation of which has been an issue of long-
standing debate. 
3  Building upon La Vallée Poussin’s earlier position, Griffiths 1981 published 
an article describing concentration and insight as diametrically opposed 
styles of meditation practice, one culminating in emptying the mind and the 
other aiming to suffuse it with a particular vision of reality. To my mind, 
this is drawing the distinction too sharply, when oftentimes the meditative 
practices being prescribed entail doing both styles of practice more or less at 
the same time; the cognitive tasks actually seem to support one other. See 
Kaur 2016 for a recent evaluation and use of Griffiths. Not citing Griffiths, 
but the earlier position of La Vallée Poussin, Gómez 1999 argues that while 
śamatha and vipaśyanå may reflect different temperaments and cognitive 
styles, these concepts or the practices to which they refer should nonetheless 
be seen on a continuum of related styles of meditation practiced within 
communities of like-minded practitioners.  
4  I completed the first draft of this essay soon after Luis Gómez passed away in 
early September 2017. Then I flew to Shanghai, China, and presented it at 
an international workshop at Fudan University. I am grateful to the 
organizers (especially Zhen Liu and Bertram Dscho) and the sponsors of the 
workshop for inviting me to participate and making it possible, financially, 
for me to do so. For one thing, it gave me an opportunity to be among 
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In order to enter into the conversation a bit more deeply, I 
want to begin by asking a couple of relatively straightforward 
yes/no questions. First, is it possible for one to become an arhat (a 
“liberated” being) through insight alone, that is, without achieving 
any degree of meditative concentration whatsoever? The consensus 
on this question, at least in the classical, mainstream Buddhist 
literature, appears to be negative, despite what some scholars and 
(perhaps) practitioners have, at times, suggested. It matters what 
one means by insight and meditative concentration, but the 
consensus seems rather to be that insight meditation (defined non-
technically), or the cultivation of insight, either includes within 
itself or presupposes some degree of meditative concentration, or 
that concentration and insight work together somehow. So, here is 
another question: is it possible to become “liberated” through 
insight meditation alone, that is, through the cultivation of wisdom 
or insight through specific “meditative” practices – the cultivation 
of “mindfulness” (sati/sm®ti), for example – without having 
achieved certain specified levels of meditative concentration, 
sometimes identified as the four “absorptions” (jhåna; dhyåna), but 
more commonly the eight “liberations” (vimokkha/vimoΣkΣa), 
including “the attainment of cessation” (nirodha-samåpatti)? The 
consensus on this question seems more affirmative: yes, at least 
some Buddhist practitioners have held this view, and many 
Buddhist meditation teachers do so today, in Burma, for instance.5 
This view does not necessarily conflict with the consensus position 
on the previous question, however, and it may even be consistent 
with (though not identical to) what the Dalai Lama suggests in the 
quote cited above. It also carries certain implications: for instance, 
it implies the possibility of becoming “liberated” without having 
cultivated or achieved certain types of extraordinary powers.  
Disagreement remains about when such an understanding 
was first formulated and expressed in Buddhist texts, and whether 
the earliest Buddhist scriptures imply or support it, but on a 
                                                                                                                                  
colleagues and make new friends at a time when I was still mourning one of 
my chief mentors in the academic life. 
5  On these points, see Wen 2009, but also Dhammajoti 2015 for an interesting 
study of classical Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma texts on this issue. The fact that 
“mindfulness” has come to be classified, anachronistically (and incorrectly) 
according to Gethin (2011: 273), as an exclusively “insight meditation” 
practice further underlines the point. 
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theoretical or practical level, if it is agreed that some degree of 
meditative concentration is necessary for, or part of, the effective 
practice of insight meditation (again, non-technically conceived), 
then much of the debate seems to boil down to the question of how 
much concentration is sufficient for the cultivation of insight to 
bring about its intended effect: paradigmatically, the achievement 
of awakening and complete cessation at the end of the present life. 
This is a theoretical question, and maybe it is also a practical 
question. It is certainly of interest to practitioners and scholars. 
Such a question (or the like, e.g., how calm and insight work 
together to achieve their intended effect) will undoubtedly prompt 
further investigations of Buddhist doctrinal, theoretical, and 
exegetical literature, and other forms of Buddhist discourse about 
meditation and the path. But in lieu of new data, historical or 
otherwise, or an alternative method of approaching old data, which 
would enable me to articulate a new perspective on such a question, 
I have sought a different way to approach the topic of the 
relationship between calm and insight. Going back to some of the 
open questions prompted by the investigations of La Vallée 
Poussin, Griffiths, Gombrich, Gómez, and others, I have tried to 
ask, more specifically, how particular Buddhist narratives depict 
specific individuals who are described as either “liberated by 
wisdom” or a “dry-insight practitioner,” and how particular 
Buddhist narratives connect calm and insight meditation.6 Seeking 
                                                           
6  These questions assume both a specific taxonomy of the (textual) data and a 
method of analysis, and I have clearly laid out neither here. I hope that a 
sense for both will emerge over the course of the essay, but at minimum I 
am assuming a definition of narrative as distinct from the paradigmatic 
mode of discourse – see, e.g., Collins 1998: 121-122 – in my view, these 
two modes can be seen as occupying the poles of a discursive spectrum with 
dialogue somewhere in the middle. So, while La Vallée Poussin marshalled 
a range of textual evidence to support his claims, and several of these texts 
have served as a basis for continuing scholarly investigations, much of this 
textual evidence is doctrinal, systematic, or theoretical in nature. A few 
scholars, like John Strong, have drawn attention to other types of sources, 
including some narrative passages that place meditation and ascetic practice 
at one end of an opposition with the preservation and mastery of Buddhist 
texts on the other. See, for example, the passages given in Strong 2002, 
under “Divisional Issues: Practice vs. Study,” section 6.3.1, pages 223-226, 
about which more will be said below. It would also be interesting to look 
more closely at the genre of practice manuals. In any case, my argument 
here assumes that the analysis of narratives requires a method sensitive to 
the fact that narratives are the object of analysis. It is also possible to look at 
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answers to these questions may enable us to bridge a divide that 
has often been maintained between narrative and doctrine, and 
approach the topic in a new way. 
Guided by these latter questions, this essay will review a 
few pertinent passages and dialogues in Påli, but its main focus 
will be on two narratives, one in Påli and the other in Sanskrit, 
neither of which has received much, if any, previous attention from 
scholars interested in the topic. One is the story of Cakkhupåla 
from the Påli Dhammapada commentary, which features a rare 
example of a specific person who is actually described in the story 
as a “dry-insight practitioner.” I place this story within the context 
of other named individuals in other Buddhist dialogues and stories 
who are described as being “liberated by wisdom,” and then 
compare these examples with a second narrative, the story of 
Sthavira from the Sanskrit Avadånaßataka, and also with a few 
more dialogues in Påli. As we will see, this second story and these 
latter examples present calm and insight as going together 
somehow, perhaps even in a combined practice. The evidence from 
all these dialogues and stories does not show a clear opposition 
between calm and insight as distinctive forms of life or practice, 
meditation or otherwise; instead, the stories either point to their 
combination under a generalized notion of practice, or alternatively 
suggest that the practice of “insight meditation” itself could stand 
for what we might broadly call “Buddhist asceticism.” Both stories 
tie a generalized notion of practice, including meditation practice, 
to an overarching ascetic or monastic lifestyle, practiced 
intensively and over a short period of time, and in this way, they 
may also connect the discussion to another important tension that 
has occupied both scholars and practitioners of Buddhism, the one 
between longer (or more gradual) and quicker (or more sudden) 
paths to awakening. Consequently, we begin to see that there is 
more at stake in these narratives than simply providing a clear 
answer to a doctrinal or practical question. For one thing, they 
project meaningful worlds of human motivation and action, and 
invite us, the readers or audience, to consider what it would mean 
to see the narrative worlds they project as our world of lived 
experience. 
                                                                                                                                  
texts typically read as expressions of doctrine or philosophy from the 
perspective that they are narratives, but that is not my primary focus here. 
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The Arhat Liberated by Wisdom and the Dry-Insight 
Practitioner 
In a few passages from canonical Buddhist literature, we 
encounter the mysterious figure of the arhat who is described as 
being “liberated by wisdom” (P. paññåvimutta; Skt. Prajñå- 
vimukta). Who is this person? What is his provenance? What is 
meant by wisdom in the contexts where this figure appears? What 
is meant by being liberated in these contexts? And what do these 
texts tell us about the means of achieving such liberation? In the 
commentaries and in some Buddhist narratives and systematic 
works, we meet this figure again. He (or ostensibly she, though I 
am unaware of any female persons who are specifically described 
this way in Buddhist texts or stories) is sometimes identified with 
another figure, the so-called “dry-insight practitioner” (P. sukkha-
vipassaka, from Skt. ßuΣka, meaning dried, parched, or withered).7 
In the context of Buddhist literature, these two figures, the one 
liberated by wisdom and the dry-insight practitioner, appear 
emblematic of a certain type of special being or person. In that 
sense, both terms convey a certain recognized social or institutional 
status within an imagined (and possibly an actual) Buddhist 
community, whatever the ontological claims of the tradition about 
the reality of the states described or implied by the terms. 
Now, classical Buddhist literature does not contain many 
examples of specifically named individuals who are described as 
either liberated by wisdom or a dry-insight practitioner, and the 
latter term seems to be limited entirely to the commentarial 
literature. The Sus¥ma-sutta from the Saµyutta-nikåya (and its 
commentary) is probably the best-known example,8 and along with 
a few other texts, this dialogue has probably received the most 
attention from scholars since La Vallée Poussin’s times.9 But it is 
                                                           
7  By extension, the Sanskrit term can sometimes carry negative connotations in 
certain contexts, where it can mean feigned, emptied, useless, or offensive. 
8  For an English translation of this dialogue, see Bodhi 2000: 612-618. This may 
be cross-referenced against the page numbering of the Pali Text Society 
(PTS) edition of the original Påli. In what follows, I have generally used the 
Cha††ha Sa∫gåyana (CS) edition of the Påli. Only in certain instances have I 
checked it against the PTS edition. 
9  Gombrich 1996 discusses the Påli and the Chinese versions of the dialogue, 
but in my view, he seems to mischaracterize the latter; Wen 2009 includes 
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rather bare of detail, and thus it has given rise to confusion as well 
as much speculation. As we will see, it is only in the Påli 
commentary and maybe also in the Chinese version that Sus¥ma is 
clearly considered to be an arhat liberated by wisdom, at all, and 
only the Påli commentary uses the key term, dry-insight 
practitioner, in this context. However, I also know of two other 
narrative exemplars, both of which have so far received less 
attention from scholars. One is the story of Cakkhupåla, the 
opening story of the Påli Commentary on the Dhammapada 
(Dhammapada††hakathå), which as stated above features a monk 
named Cakkhupåla who is explicitly described as a dry-insight 
practitioner.10 The other is found in an episode from a story in the 
Divyåvadåna, where a monk named P¨rˆa Kuˆ∂opadhån¥yaka is 
described as being liberated by wisdom.11 As we will see, both of 
these examples provide more narrative context than does the 
Sus¥ma-sutta. So, analyzing them can help us to gain a fuller 
picture of what the texts might have in mind when they say that 
someone is liberated by wisdom or a dry-insight practitioner, thus 
providing an understanding that may then be used to reconsider 
better-known texts like the Sus¥ma-sutta and its commentary. 
Apart from these three examples, the other occurrences in 
the classical literature of the concept of being liberated by wisdom 
are more abstract and theoretical. They do not concern specifically 
named individuals. Rather, they are found in lists of different types 
of persons and their attributes. This is true, for instance, in the 
Puggalapaññatti and the K¥†ågiri-sutta.12 No specific persons are 
explicitly mentioned there. This is also true for the Kosamb¥-sutta, 
which features the well-known dialogue with Mus¥la and Nårada, 
which provided La Vallée Poussin with the title of his famous 
                                                                                                                                  
an English translation of the Chinese, which helps one to see how this might 
be so. 
10  Again, I have used the CS edition as my main source for this story, but in this 
case, I have also compared it against the PTS edition in Norman 1906: 3-24; 
for an English translation of the PTS edition, see Burlingame 1921: 146ff. 
11  For the principal Sanskrit edition, see Cowell and Neil 1886; for an English 
translation, see Rotman 2008. On this episode, see also Strong 1992: 141ff. 
12  The Kī†ågiri-sutta is dialogue 70 of the Majjhima-nikåya (MN). For an 
English translation, see Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 577-584; for the PTS 
edition, see vol. 1, 473-481. For the PTS edition of the Puggalapaññati, see 
Morris 1883; and for an English translation, see Law 1924. 
  The Blind Arhat and the Old Baby: Liberation by Wisdom, … 29 
essay.13 As Gómez (1999) has pointed out, neither the Chinese nor 
the Påli portrays Mus¥la as unambiguously claiming to be an arhat 
in the first place, much less one liberated by wisdom or the like; so 
for the remainder of this section, I want to return briefly to the 
Sus¥ma-sutta, which occurs in very close proximity to the 
Kosamb¥-sutta in the Påli Buddhist canonical discourses, and use it 
to establish a working framework for thinking about the other two 
narrative examples, which I will discuss in the next section. 
As the dialogue opens, an ascetic named Sus¥ma decides to 
become ordained as a Buddhist monk, because he witnesses the 
material support the Buddha’s monks have been receiving from the 
lay community. After becoming a Buddhist monk, Sus¥ma hears 
about a number of monks who assert that they are arhats. He is 
curious and goes to speak with them, and he asks them whether 
they also possess five types of “extraordinary knowledge and 
powers” (abhiññå), including “superhuman powers” (iddhi) and so 
forth. In each case, they say they do not. Then Sus¥ma asks them 
whether they “have known and seen those calm liberations that 
transcend material form and are immaterial, or have touched them 
with the body” (janantå evaµ passantå ye te santå vimokkhå 
atikkamma r¨pe åruppå te kåyena phusitvå viharatha). Again, they 
say they have not. Sus¥ma doesn’t understand how one could be an 
arhat and not possess these qualities or powers. The monks then 
explain that they are “liberated by wisdom” (paññåvimutta). 
 Sus¥ma still doesn’t understand what they are saying, and 
so he goes to see the Buddha and conveys the entire conversation 
to him. The Buddha then explains: “Sus¥ma, at first there is 
knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma (dhamma††hitiñåˆa),14 
and afterwards there is knowledge of cessation.” Since the 
Buddha’s explanation here is quite terse and unclear, the discourse 
seems to want to explain what he means with an analogy. The 
Buddha likens Sus¥ma’s own understanding of basic principles of 
the Dhamma to that of the monks “liberated by wisdom,” but it is 
unclear, at least from the Påli version, that Sus¥ma actually is an 
arhat at this point. In fact, this never becomes clear in the Påli 
                                                           
13  For an English translation of this short dialogue, see Bodhi 2000, 609-611; it 
is found in the PTS edition, vol. 2, 115-118. 
14  See Bodhi 2000, 785, n. 211, for the commentary’s explanation of this odd 
phrase. 
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version, and thus the analogy between Sus¥ma and the arhats 
liberated by wisdom remains uncertain. In the version found in the 
Chinese ågamas, however, Sus¥ma gains a “dust-free, stainless, 
purified vision of the Dhamma” as a result of his discussion with 
the Buddha, and this seems to be equivalent to gaining knowledge 
of the stability of the Dhamma. Then, at the end of the dialogue, the 
Chinese version states very clearly that Sus¥ma becomes an arhat. 
 Now, it seems to me that the Sus¥ma-sutta as currently 
extant in both Påli and Chinese tries to address two distinct 
questions, though both of these more specific questions could be 
contained within the general question: what does it mean to say 
that someone is liberated by wisdom? One of the more specific 
questions relates to the qualities or powers that an arhat liberated 
by wisdom possesses, or rather does not possess: in short, what 
does an arhat liberated by wisdom know or do? The second distinct, 
more specific question addressed in the discourse concerns how 
one becomes liberated by wisdom. In response to this second 
question, the discourse suggests stages or some sort of process 
whereby becoming established or stabilized in one’s knowledge of 
the Dhamma leads to liberation, but it may also suggest that 
engaging in a dialogue with the Buddha can itself be liberating.  
 As it stands in the extant Påli and Chinese texts of the 
Sus¥ma-sutta, the different answers to these two questions sit 
uneasily together, though the Chinese version tries to smooth over 
the transitions and close the gaps in the narrative. So, too, do the 
Påli commentaries, which explicitly draw the parallel between 
Sus¥ma and the arhats liberated by wisdom, and also make the 
explicit connection between the arhat liberated by wisdom and the 
dry-insight practitioner. Consider the following passage from the 
Påli commentary:   
For what reason does he [the Buddha] begin by saying “And 
do you, also, Sus¥ma…”? The purpose is to make clear that 
the monks are dry-insight practitioners (sukkhavipassaka) 
who have not achieved absorption (nijjhånaka). Indeed, this 
is the intention here: “It isn’t that you [Sus¥ma], solely, are a 
dry-insight practitioner who has not achieved absorption. 
These monks are the same, too.”15  
                                                           
15  Following the CS edition: Api pana tvaµ susīmåti idaµ kasmå årabhi? 
Nijjhånakånaµ sukkhavipassakabhikkh¨naµ påka†akaraˆatthaµ. 
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So, it looks like an attempt is being made here in the commentary 
to establish a series of connections that are not at all made clear in 
the extant text, either in the Påli or the Chinese version. For one 
thing, the commentary attempts to establish a parallel between the 
unnamed monks who call themselves “liberated by wisdom,” and 
Sus¥ma, who makes no such claim. It also attempts to establish an 
equivalency between being liberated by wisdom and being a dry-
insight practitioner, without the latter term being used in the 
discourse itself. 
Quite significantly, the Påli commentary also glosses the 
expression “liberated by wisdom” (paññåvimutta), used in the 
discourse by the unnamed monks to describe themselves, with the 
following explanation: “‘Friend, we are liberated by wisdom,’ 
means ‘friend, we are dry-insight practitioners who have not 
achieved absorption and are liberated by wisdom alone’.”16 Also 
significantly, the commentary glosses the rather opaque phrase, 
“knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma,” as “knowledge 
through insight (meditation)” (vipassanåñåˆa). The commentary 
thus places a great deal of emphasis on the cultivation of vipassanå 
as the means by which one becomes an arhat liberated by wisdom, 
its practice being one of the distinguishing characteristics of this 
type of person, according to the commentary.17 But while it is fairly 
clear that the Sus¥ma-sutta does conceive of such a person in 
general terms, and provides some general characteristics of such a 
person, such as the fact that such persons have not experienced 
certain states of meditative absorption and do not possess certain 
extraordinary powers, it is not entirely clear that the discourse itself 
names Sus¥ma as being one such specific individual, or that it 
clarifies the means by which he (or anyone else) becomes one, 
whatever the commentary may say. 
                                                                                                                                  
Ayañhettha adhippåyo – na kevalaµ tvameva nijjhånako sukkhavipassako 
etepi bhikkh¨ evar¨påyevåti. 
16  Paññåvimuttå kho mayaµ, åvusoti, åvuso, mayaµ nijjhånakå sukkhavipassakå 
paññåmatteneva vimuttåti dasseti. The italicized phrase above is an attempt 
to convey the double emphasis in the original, paññåmatteneva, “precisely 
(or only) through wisdom alone.” 
17  The commentary maybe also indicates that vipassanå and the knowledge 
arising from it belongs on a continuum of practices and types of knowledge 
that arise over time, when it comments: Nibbåne ñåˆanti vipassanåya 
ciˆˆante pavattamaggañåˆaµ taµ pacchå uppajjati. 
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The Blind Arhat as Dry-Insight Practitioner, and a Monk who 
is Liberated by Wisdom 
In the previous section, I attempted to establish a basic 
framework for thinking about how some Påli canonical sources 
discuss the nature of the arhat liberated by wisdom, and how the 
Påli commentary establishes a connection between this type of 
person, the practice of insight, and the so-called dry-insight 
practitioner. In particular, we saw that the Sus¥ma-sutta, which 
scholars have identified as one of the key texts for establishing 
these connections, is less clear than one might wish, especially for 
the purposes of supporting such an important claim as 
“Enlightenment can be attained without meditation, by a process of 
intellectual analysis alone.” We saw that several of the basic terms, 
definitions, and connections are found only in the commentary, and 
even in the commentary, the practice of insight does not entail 
mere intellectual analysis. With the Sus¥ma-sutta, we are 
confronted with a hybrid text, one that has given rise to several 
layers of exegesis, and it is difficult to pull apart the various 
strands and see how they are woven together. This is where the 
next story may aid us. Since it is a relatively complete narrative, it 
can be treated more holistically, and it features a specific character 
that the story itself describes as a dry-insight practitioner. 
This narrative is also found in a commentary, but perhaps a 
different level or kind of commentary: it comes from the Påli 
commentary on the Dhammapada, where it features as the first 
story of the collection. Over time, the commentary on the 
Dhammapada became a large storehouse of Buddhist narrative 
literature. The introductory verses claim that it is a translation into 
Påli of a commentary in Sinhalese dialect that had been handed 
down by tradition. While the precise relationship between this 
commentary on the Dhammapada and the commentaries on the 
four main Nikåyas remains unclear, this particular story may help 
us to shed some further light on the concept of the “dry-insight 
practitioner” and the type of practices that were associated with 
such a person. In this way, we can learn more about what some 
Buddhists may have thought it meant to “practice insight 
meditation” or achieve liberation “through wisdom alone.” 
 The story features someone named Påla or Mahåpåla, “Big 
Påla,” the eldest son of a wealthy householder in the city of 
Såvatthi during the time of the Buddha. He is named Påla, 
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“Protector,” because he was born only after his father built an 
enclosure protecting a large tree he believed to be inhabited by a 
powerful yakkha or tree spirit. The householder eventually has two 
sons, whom he calls Big Påla and Little Påla. Both sons are 
married, and then some time later the parents die, leaving 
everything to the two sons. At this point in the story, the Buddha is 
said to be residing in the Jetavana Monastery; one day, Big Påla 
sees a large group of laypeople going to see the Buddha and hear 
him preach the Dharma. He accompanies them, and after hearing 
the Buddha’s sermon, he decides to become a monk. He seeks the 
Buddha’s permission, and the Buddha requires him to ask his 
younger brother first. The younger brother tries to dissuade him, 
making various arguments, including one that Big Påla is still a 
young man, and that he should wait and become a monk when he is 
old, but Big Påla remains adamant that he will join the monastic 
order immediately, and he is allowed to do so. According to the 
story, he then spends nearly five years as a monk, after which point 
he goes to see the Buddha. 
Here the story becomes quite interesting for the present 
discussion. Big Påla begins by asking the Buddha a question: 
“Respected one,” he asks, “how many responsibilities (dhura) are 
there in this teaching?” The Buddha responds, “Monks have only 
two responsibilities, namely, the responsibility to learn the texts 
(ganthadhura) and the responsibility to practice insight meditation 
(vipassanådhura).” Big Påla then asks the Buddha to explain what 
these two responsibilities entail. The Buddha describes the 
responsibility of learning texts as follows:  
In accordance with one’s own wisdom/discernment (paññå), 
one learns the Word of the Buddha (buddhavacana), either 
one or two nikåyas, or indeed the whole Tripi†aka, and one 
holds it in mind, recites it, and teaches it.18  
The Buddha then describes the responsibility for practicing insight 
meditation in this way:  
One lives simply; and indeed, one finds happiness in having 
one’s seat and bed in a secluded location; becoming well-
established in the viewpoint that one’s whole person is 
                                                           
18  Attano paññånur¨pena ekaµ vå dve vå nikåye sakalaµ vå pana 
tepi†akaµbuddhavacanaµ uggaˆhitvå tassa dhåraˆaµ kathanaµ 
våcananti… 
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subject to decay and destruction, one dwells persistently 
practicing insight meditation, and one becomes an arhat.19  
Although we find here some kind of opposition or dichotomy 
between textual study and meditation practice, the latter also 
involving a high degree of asceticism, at the same time these two 
“responsibilities” are not presented as a clear opposition between 
two different paths to the same goal, nor between two different 
goals or conceptions of the ultimate. Even though the responsibility 
to practice insight meditation is explicitly said to lead one to 
become an arhat, the ultimate goal of the responsibility to study 
texts is not made clear. Ostensibly, the immediate goal is the 
ability to recite and teach the Dhamma, but the precise relationship 
between the two responsibilities, whether they are mutually 
exclusive, how they should be balanced, who should do what, 
when, and so forth: none of this is explored any further in the story.  
Instead, upon hearing about these two responsibilities, Big 
Påla says: “Respected one, since I have become a monk when I am 
an old man, it is not possible for me to fulfill the responsibility of 
learning the texts, but I can fulfill the responsibility of practicing 
insight meditation. Therefore, please teach me a meditation 
practice (kamma††håna).” This statement is a bit odd, since Big 
Påla’s younger brother had previously argued unsuccessfully that 
Big Påla wait until he was an old man to become a monk, but no 
mention is made of this discrepancy. The Buddha simply gives him 
what the story describes as a meditation practice that will lead him 
to become an arhat, and we are left to consider Big Påla’s 
motivations for choosing insight meditation practice over learning 
the texts. Can it really be that he considers the practice of insight 
meditation to be more doable than learning texts, or are his 
motivations actually more direct and extreme in their focus? 
No more specific description of the Buddha’s meditation 
instructions to Big Påla is found in the story, but as it proceeds, Big 
Påla gathers a group of sixty like-minded monks, and together they 
search for a place to practice during the three months of the 
monsoon retreat. They travel a long distance until they reach a 
large town said to be in the border regions. There they develop a 
                                                           
19  Sallahukavuttino pana pantasenåsanåbhiratassa attabhåve khayavayaµ 
pa††hapetvå såtaccakiriyavasena vipassanaµ vavvhetvå 
arahattaggahaˆanti… 
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positive relationship with the local community, who build them a 
monastery and supply them with food and other material support. 
As they settle into their practice, the monks discuss their plans for 
the retreat, and while the other monks decide that they will spend 
time “in all four postures” (standing, sitting, walking, and lying 
down), Big Påla makes a vow that he will not lie down during the 
entire rains retreat. So, while the details of the meditation practice 
remain vague, the story emphasizes the theme of Big Påla’s 
asceticism.  
Indeed, Big Påla’s perseverance and effort, his brute 
asceticism, is extremely intense. His vow not to lie down results in 
his eyes beginning to burn and weep. Although a local doctor treats 
him for the condition, the doctor tells him he must lie down for the 
treatment to work. Big Påla refuses to do this, for it would break 
his vow, and the doctor eventually abandons him to his own 
devices. The monk perseveres with his practices, and as a result he 
loses his eyesight at the same time that he becomes an arhat. This is 
apparently what earns him the rather ironic nickname, Cakkhupåla, 
“Protector of the Eyes.” The doctor/patient relationship depicted in 
the story would be interesting to consider further, but for our 
purposes the moment he loses his eyesight and becomes an arhat is 
the most significant one in the story, because here the story 
explicitly describes him as a “dry-insight practitioner” (sukkha-
vipassaka).   
It is worth emphasizing again that this is the only instance I 
have found in which a specifically named individual is described 
with this term within an actual story itself. Recall that it is only in 
the Påli commentary that Sus¥ma is described in this way; the 
Chinese translation of the discourse maybe implies that he is an 
arhat liberated by wisdom, but the Påli version of the Sus¥ma-sutta 
arguably ascribes this description only to a general type of person 
or to a group of unnamed individuals who are contrasted with 
Sus¥ma. This conclusion has for support no less an authority than 
Dhammapåla himself, who says almost exactly the same thing in a 
comment from the Theragåthå commentary. Writing about the dry-
insight practitioner as a type of arhat, he says, “And this 
classification is stated after having investigated the general nature 
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of the disciples. Here, in the ‘Påli canonical texts’ (Påliya), we do 
not encounter any dry-insight practitioners at all.”20  
Apart from Tzungkuen Wen in his 2009 dissertation, I am 
aware of no other scholar who has drawn attention to the 
Cakkhupåla story in discussions of the topic of the arhat liberated 
by wisdom or the dry-insight practitioner. This is surprising given 
how much has been written on this topic. It is even more surprising 
given that La Vallée Poussin himself is credited with co-translating 
the Cakkhupåla story into French with Godefroy de Blonay in 1892. 
In their translation, however, the key phrase has not been translated 
for some reason. The pertinent portion reads only, “He became an 
Arhat, entered into his cell, and sat down” (Il devint un Arhat, 
entra dans sa cellule et s’assit).21 A possible reason for the general 
neglect may be the fact that Burlingame seems to have 
mistranslated the key phrase as “dwelling in the bliss of Spiritual 
Insight” in his influential translation of the Dhammapada 
commentary.22 However, Wen’s careful method of searching the 
Cha††ha Sa∫gåyana edition for all occurrences of the term, 
                                                           
20  Dhammapåla, Paramatthadīpanī, Vol. 3, p. 209: Ayañca vibhågo såvakånaµ 
sådhåraˆabhåvaµ upaparikkhitvå vutto. Idha påḷiyaµ ågatå nattheva. See 
also Wen 2009: 196. The Theragåthå commentary contains a parallel 
version of the Cakkhupåla story, and in that telling as well, Cakkhupåla is 
called a dry-insight practitioner and arhat, as Wen (2009: 195) also notes. 
By påliya here, I take it that Dhammapåla means “the canonical literature,” 
and thus he seems to exclude the commentaries, where we find the 
Cakkhupåla story in its full form. Cakkhupåla is not described as a dry-
insight practitioner in the Theragåthå itself. And it is noteworthy that 
Dhammapåla does not mention Susīma here either. 
21  La Vallée Poussin and Blonay 1892: 186. 
22  Burlingame 1921, vol. 1, 152. In fact, the PTS edition of the Dhammapada 
commentary reads sukhavipassaka, Norman 1906: 12, without any 
indication of emendation, rather than sukkhavipassaka, which is what one 
finds in the Cha††ha Sa∫gåyana edition of the Dhammapada commentary 
and in the parallel story in the Theragåthå commentary in both the PTS and 
CS editions. Alternatively, even if one takes the phrase here to read sudha- 
or maybe suddha-vipassaka, then still in that case Burlingame’s translation 
would seem to be incorrect. It should then be something like “pure insight 
practitioner,” carrying much the same meaning as “dry insight practitioner.” 
See Wen 2009: 8, 91, 145ff, and 189 for some passages in which we find 
suddhavipassaka used as an alternate term and even as alternative reading 
for sukkhavipassaka, for instance, in the commentary on the Itivuttaka (189). 
Both these terms are also found a few times and seemingly synonymously in 
the Visuddhimagga and its commentary (Wen 2009: 145ff). 
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sukkhavipassaka, uncovered this story as well. Perhaps there is 
another, still more basic, reason for the neglect of this story in 
modern academic discussions of insight meditation practice: the 
general neglect of narrative literature in discussions of Buddhist 
intellectual history, including the history of the theory of practice. 
So, what does this story reveal about the commentarial 
understanding of the arhat liberated by wisdom and his style of 
practice? For one thing, it actually muddles the image by upsetting 
whatever clean parallel we might have drawn between 
concentration and insight, on the one hand, and “meditation 
practice” and “the vocation of (textual) study,” on the other. In this 
story, no contrast is ever explicitly found between two or more 
styles of meditation, such as calm and insight. Instead, the monks 
devoted to vipassanå or the kamma††håna practice would actually 
seem to parallel those “practitioners of the jhånas” (jhåyin) in the 
well-known Mahåcunda-sutta in the A∫guttara-nikåya, where such 
“meditators” are famously contrasted with the so-called 
“specialists in the Dhamma” (dhammayoga). 23  Drawing the full 
parallel, however, would require that we identify the monks 
responsible for learning the texts (ganthadhura) of this story with 
the specialists in the Dhamma (dhammayoga) of that discourse, 
and that may well be inappropriate, especially if Gómez (1999) is 
correct in his understanding of the latter as itself a form of 
meditation practice.  
Perhaps there is actually a clearer dichotomy articulated in 
the Cakkhupåla story between the vocations of textual study and 
meditation practice than there is in the Mahåcunda-sutta, but while 
the meditation practice is presented as efficient insofar as it does 
enable Big Påla to become an arhat, his practice is not described in 
any detail and it is explicitly tied to an entire ascetic lifestyle, 
which Big Påla embodies and the Buddha initially describes as part 
of the responsibility of practicing insight meditation. The story of 
Cakkhupåla also emphasizes these ascetic practices, since only he 
makes the vow not to lie down during the retreat, and only he goes 
blind. The story thus distinguishes between different levels of 
asceticism, and not between different types of meditation. 
                                                           
23  For an English translation of this discourse, see Bodhi 2012: 917-919. In the 
PTS edition of the Påli, this discourse is found in vol. 3, p. 355-356. See 
also Gombrich 1996, Gómez 1999, and La Vallée Poussin 1937a. 
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Certain echoes of this story also indicate that it was 
understood more in terms of its emphasis on asceticism than on 
what we might commonly consider the practice of insight 
meditation. In his well-known anthology of sources, The 
Experience of Buddhism, John Strong (2002: 223-224) translates a 
portion of the Paµsuk¨lånisaµsa (a Påli text he calls “late”), 
which contains the key paragraph from the Dhammapada 
commentary, describing the two responsibilities of the monk, but 
changes other details of the narrative. Strong frames the passage 
using a number of the same dichotomies we have been discussing, 
primarily emphasizing the difference between textual study and 
meditation practice. Returning to the same set of passages later in 
Buddhisms: An Introduction, Strong points out that these two 
responsibilities were not necessarily seen as mutually exclusive, 
though they were sometimes in tension.24 
In the Paµsuk¨lånisaµsa, the description of the vocation of 
study is identical to what is found in the Dhammapada 
commentary, but the vocation of meditation is described rather 
differently. Initially, it is defined using some of the same terms as 
the Dhammapada commentary: “A monk cultivates insight into 
destruction and aging, and thereby achieves the state of an arhat.”25 
However, after Kassapa, who is the Buddha’s interlocutor here, 
gives a response that is the same as what Cakkhupåla says in the 
Dhammapada commentary about choosing the vocation of insight 
meditation because he is an old man, the Paµsuk¨lånisaµsa adds: 
“Speaking about the vocation of insight, the Blessed One said, 
‘Kassapa, buddhas praise the thirteen ascetic practices 
(dhutå∫ga)...’,” and the text goes on to discuss the technical issue 
of the monk’s robes in more detail. 26  In this way, this “late” 
Buddhist text also connects the vocation of insight meditation to 
the broader ascetic lifestyle.  
If the concentration/insight dichotomy does not always or 
necessarily parallel the dichotomy between meditation practice and 
textual study, how then should we understand the figure of the 
                                                           
24  Strong 2015: 208-209. In this respect, he seems to rely mainly on his prior 
textual evidence, but also points to other scholastic formulations. 
25  Gisette Martini 1973: eko bhikkhu khayavayavipassanaµ vavhetvå yavå 
arahattaµ patvå… (68). 
26  Martini 1973: bhagavå vipassanådhuram kathesi « kassapa terasadhuta∫gåni 
buddhå pasaµsanti… (68). 
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arhat liberated by wisdom or the dry insight practitioner? Such a 
figure seems most clearly defined as an arhat who has not achieved 
the eight “liberations,” including the attainment of cessation, or an 
arhat who does not possess the five types of extraordinary 
knowledge and powers, or an arhat who does not possess some 
combination of these attainments.27 This is what the Sus¥ma-sutta 
says, and it is also clear from the Cakkhupåla story that the blind 
arhat does not possess any extraordinary powers or attainments 
besides, of course, being an arhat. While the display of superhuman 
powers is not a major theme in the story, it does emphasize 
Cakkhupåla’s blindness, which is not miraculously healed by the 
gods or the Buddha or an act of truth; the story is about the power 
of past actions to condition and impose limitations even upon the 
nature and abilities of the arhat. Such attainments and abilities 
would also include certain states of meditative absorption above 
the realm of the material, the sensual, and the conceptual, and they 
would include certain types of “mundane” knowledge and powers 
that are considered somehow extraordinary or superhuman, being 
some of the same types of powers and knowledge possessed by 
gods, wheel-turning kings, and other divine or semi-divine beings. 
This lack of superhuman powers is also the key 
characteristic distinguishing the arhat liberated by wisdom in the 
final narrative episode I want to discuss in this section. This 
example comes from the story of P¨rˆa in the Divyåvadåna. In the 
story, a layman named P¨rˆa, who lives in the city of S¨rpåraka on 
the western coast of India, invites the Buddha and his community 
of monks to travel there for a meal. Meanwhile the Buddha is 
staying in the north in the city of Íråvast¥. He nonetheless 
perceives the layman’s invitation, which takes on wondrous 
proportions through the Buddha’s power, and consents to go. The 
Buddha and many of the elders take meal tickets, and the Buddha 
tells Ónanda to inform the other monks that whoever else wishes to 
go for the meal should take a meal ticket. 
Ónanda goes to the assembly, makes the announcement, 
and begins to hand out meal tickets. There is another monk in 
attendance, also named P¨rˆa or the One Who Uses His Water Pot 
for a Pillow (Kuˆvopadhån¥yaka); he also wishes to go, and 
                                                           
27  This statement also accords with the most recent findings of Wen 2009 and 
Dhammajoti 2015 with respect to the Sarvåstivåda canonical and scholastic 
materials preserved in Chinese. 
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reaches for a meal ticket. However, P¨rˆa or “Little P¨®na” 
(P¨rˆaka), as he is called in the story, is said to be “liberated by 
wisdom” (prajñåvimukta). So, when he reaches for a meal ticket, 
Ónanda says to him in verse: 
Venerable one, this is not an invitation to eat in the home of 
the King of Koßala; 
Nor in the palace of Sudatta [i.e., Anathåpiˆvika]; nor in the 
mansion of M®gåra. 
 
The city of S¨rpåraka is more than a hundred leagues from 
here; 
One must go there with superhuman powers. So, you be 
quiet, little P¨®na.28 
The narrator of the story then explains: “He [P¨rˆa] was liberated 
by wisdom. Therefore, he had not acquired superhuman powers (sa 
prajñåvimukta˙ tena ®ddhir notpåditå).” This makes the equation 
quite clear: liberation by wisdom equals no superhuman powers. 
However, the matter does not the end there. P¨rˆa reflects, “Even 
though I have vomited out, spit out, thrown away, and driven away 
the whole mass of afflictions, I do not possess the superhuman 
powers that are shared in common with the rival ascetics.” So, he 
“practices vigor” (v¥ryam åsthåya) and acquires superhuman 
powers so quickly that he stretches out his arm like the trunk of an 
elephant and takes one before Ónanda can give a meal ticket to a 
third elder. Then P¨rˆa utters the following verses: 
Not by having a wonderful body, nor by learning (ßruta), nor 
by virtue of using force, O Gautama; not even by using 
powerful words or wishes, does one acquire the six kinds of 
extraordinary knowledge and power here in this world. 
Indeed, for someone like me, whose youth has truly been 
crushed by old age, the six kinds of extraordinary knowledge 
and power are essayed through the powers of meditation 
                                                           
28  Cowell and Neal 1886: Naitad bhoktavyam åyuΣman kośalådhipater gṛhe | 
agåre vå sudattasya [em.; Cowell and Neal: sujåtasya; Tib: rab sbyin] 
mṛgårabhavane ’thavå || sådhikaµ yojanaśataµ S¨rpårakam ita˙ puram | 
ṛddhibhir yatra gantavyaµ t¨Σˆī tvaµ bhava P¨rˆaketi (44). See also 
Rotman 2008: 99 and 409, n. 313. 
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(dhyåna), and through the various powers of calm (ßama), 
moral virtue (ß¥la), and insight meditation (vipaßyanå).29 
The Buddha then praises P¨rˆa as greatest among his monks for 
taking meal tickets. In the story, the whole episode forms a kind of 
preface to the Buddha’s own wondrous display, whereby (in part) 
he and the monks all fly to S¨rpåraka on different types of 
marvelous creatures and flying vehicles. P¨rˆa’s verses also briefly 
indicate how one does (and does not) acquire such extraordinary 
knowledge and superhuman power. It is noteworthy that insight 
meditation is listed here alongside the cultivation of calming 
meditation and moral virtue as the means by which one does 
acquire such knowledge and powers. By the same token, the lack 
of extraordinary knowledge and superhuman power is what 
distinguishes P¨rˆa as one liberated by wisdom from the other 
elders, though the episode sheds no additional light on how one 
becomes liberated by wisdom. Still, the relative ease with which 
P¨rˆa develops the powers, and his explanation of the means to 
achieve them, suggests that calm and insight meditation belong on 
a continuum of meditative practices on the path rather than in strict 
opposition as competing forms of life or practice. 
 
The Story of Old Baby and the Pairing of Calm and Insight 
Meditation 
There are many passages among the Påli canonical texts in 
which calm and insight meditation appear in tandem or as a pair. 
Sometimes, arguably, they also appear to be in some kind of 
tension. One such passage is found in the A∫guttara-nikåya; the 
Buddha is speaking: 
Monks, these two factors (dhamma) lead to knowledge 
(vijjå). What are the two? Calm (samatha) and insight 
(vipassanå). Monks, when calm is cultivated, what effect 
does it have? One cultivates the mind. When the mind is 
cultivated, what effect does it have? Desire vanishes. Monks, 
when insight is cultivated, what effect does it have? One 
cultivates wisdom. When wisdom is cultivated, what effect 
                                                           
29  Cowell and Neil 1886: Na vapuΣmattayå śrutena vå na balåtkåraguˆaiś ca 
Gautama | prabalair api vå∫manorathai˙ Σavabhijñatvam ihådhigamyate || 
śamaśīlavipaśyanåbalair vividhair dhyånabalai˙ parīkΣitå˙ | jarayå hi 
nipīvitayauvanå˙ Σavabhijñå hi bhavanti madvidhå iti || (44). 
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does it have? Ignorance vanishes. Monks, a mind that is 
stained by desire is not liberated, while wisdom that is 
stained by ignorance is not cultivated. Therefore, monks, the 
disappearance of desire is liberation of the mind, and the 
disappearance of ignorance is liberation by wisdom.30 
Here, we find a number of paired concepts aligned with one 
another: “liberation of (or by) mind” (cetovimutti) and “liberation 
by (or of) wisdom” (paññåvimutti), passion and ignorance, and 
calm and insight. Gombrich connects this passage to the end of the 
Mahåmålunkyaputta-sutta of the Majjhima-nikåya, wherein 
Ónanda asks the Buddha to explain how some monks can be 
liberated of/by mind (cetovimutta), while some other monks can be 
liberated by/of wisdom (paññåvimutta). In that context, the Buddha 
responds, quite tersely as Gombrich notes, that “this is due to a 
difference in their faculties” (ettha kho tesåhaµ ånanda 
indriyavemattataµ vadåmi). 31  Gombrich says this passage 
“strongly suggests that there are two…qualitatively different 
experiences of release.” 32  In the A∫guttara-nikåya passage 
translated above, however, there do not appear to be two different 
goals, but only one: knowledge (vijjå), which seems tantamount to 
awakening, liberation, or cessation of suffering. 
                                                           
30  The CS edition reads: Dve me, bhikkhave, dhammå vijjåbhågiyå. Katame dve? 
Samatho ca vipassanå ca. Samatho, bhikkhave, bhåvito kamattha [kimattha 
(syå. kaµ.), katamattha (ka.)] manubhoti? Cittaµ bhåvīyati. Cittaµ 
bhåvitaµ kamatthamanubhoti? Yo rågo so pahīyati. Vipassanå, bhikkhave, 
bhåvitå kamatthamanubhoti? Paññå bhåvīyati. Paññå bhåvitå 
kamatthamanubhoti? Yå avijjå så pahīyati. Rågupakkili††haµ vå, bhikkhave, 
cittaµ na vimuccati, avijjupakkili††hå vå paññå bhåvīyati. Iti kho, bhikkhave, 
rågavirågå cetovimutti, avijjåvirågå paññåvimuttī ti. In the PTS edition, it is 
in vol. 1, p. 61. Alternative translations may be found in Bodhi 2012: 152-
153, and Gombrich 1996: 113. 
31  For a translation of this discourse, see Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 537-551. 
The relevant passage is found on page 451, and in the PTS edition is found 
on vol. 1, p. 437. The proximate context for the distinction in this dialogue 
is the Buddha’s discussion of the eight “liberations” (vimokkha) on the path 
to the elimination of the five fetters and the achievement of nibbåna. 
32  Gombrich 1996: 112ff. To my mind, he does not seem entirely resolved within 
himself on whether these passages suggest two different paths, two different 
goals, or both. He speaks of “two … qualitatively different experiences of 
release” (113), and that: “The above [A∫guttara-nikåya] passage…suggests 
two paths to nirvana” (114). Then later he says that it suggests that “to attain 
nirvana both methods must to some extent be employed” (114). 
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The passage may suggest some kind of tension between two 
different methods or tools for achieving this knowledge or 
liberation, based on the elimination of the two different causes of 
suffering implied here, passion and ignorance, but these different 
causes are not placed in opposition, at least not here. They are 
combined, and again, the Påli commentary suggests a gradual path 
to bring about their cessation. Speaking first about the cultivation 
of mind, the commentary takes it as a much more specific claim, 
which might prompt a change of translation in the original. It 
glosses citta, “mind” or “thought,” as maggacitta, ostensibly “the 
thought of (or maybe for) the path.” This interpretation makes 
sense insofar as it is the path that eliminates desire or “craving” 
(tanhå), for instance, in the context of the Buddha’s explanation of 
the four noble truths in the first sermon.33 And this might make a 
difference here, because one could then say that one is liberated by 
the thought of the path, and not that the mind is liberated. Perhaps 
then the grammar would align better with the idea of liberation by 
wisdom (paññåvimutti).  
The broader point here is that the commentary relies on the 
concept of the path to connect the different paired concepts. When 
discussing the cultivation of wisdom, it also glosses wisdom or 
discernment as maggapaññå, “the wisdom of (or about or from) 
the path,” and then makes the interesting claim that “the thought of 
the path and the wisdom of the path are said to be two factors that 
arise together” (maggacittaµ maggapaññåti dvepi sahajåta-
dhammåva kathitå). At the end of the commentary on this passage, 
the commentator also makes the point that “in this discourse, 
concentration and insight are said to be momentary and diverse” 
(imasmiµ sutte nånåkkhaˆikå samådhivipassanå kathitåti). It is 
unclear to me precisely what this means; maybe they arise at 
different moments on the path? The commentary suggests that the 
path connects calm and insight to the elimination of passion and 
ignorance and to the cultivation of thought and wisdom, which then 
leads to knowledge. 
                                                           
33  For an English translation of the version of the first sermon I have in mind, see 
Bodhi 2000: 1843-1847; in the PTS edition, this is found in vol. 5, p. 420-
424. 
44   The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 20, 2019 
 Another canonical discourse that pairs calm and insight 
meditation is the Mahåvacchagotta-sutta of the Majjhima-nikåya.34 
In this sutta, Vacchagotta goes to see the Buddha after practicing 
for some four years as a monk. He says he has achieved all the 
knowledge that he can achieve through training, and he asks for a 
higher or further teaching (uttari or uttariµ dhammaµ, maybe, a 
teaching about what is higher). The Buddha says, “In that case, you 
should cultivate two higher (or further) factors (teachings, practices, 
things, dhamma): calm and insight.”35 He says that one who has 
cultivated these two higher factors will be able to penetrate 
manifold states or realms (dhåtu), and then goes on to explain that 
such a person will attain superhuman powers, the divine ear, 
knowledge of other minds, memory of past lives, the divine eye, 
and finally, the following:  
To the extent that you may wish – “May I, through my own 
higher or direct knowledge (sayam abhiññå) in this very 
lifetime, realize, attain, and dwell in the liberation by 
wisdom (paññåvimutti), the liberation by mind (cetovimutti), 
which is stainless due to the destruction of the stains” – you 
will be able to realize and attain precisely that for which 
there is a basis.36  
This last state or level of attainment is equivalent to awakening and 
becoming an arhat, and the language bears certain similarities to 
other descriptions of the awakened state, but for our purposes here, 
I want to note the pairing of the terms “liberation of/by mind” and 
the “liberation of/by wisdom.” There is no tension here between 
different types of awakening or liberation; the terms are used 
almost synonymously. Nor is there is any indication in this 
discourse of different paths to this goal; rather, the contrast is 
between training practices and a higher or further teaching, 
suggesting a single, gradated process or continuum of practices, 
not a dichotomy between alternatives. 
                                                           
34  For an English translation, see Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 595-602; in the PTS 
edition, it is vol. 1, p. 489ff. 
35  Following the CS edition: tena hi tvaµ, Vaccha, dve dhamme uttari bhåvehi – 
samathañca vipassanañca. 
36  So tvaµ, Vaccha, yåvadeva åka∫khissasi – åsavånaµ khayå anåsavaµ 
cetovimuttiµ paññåvimuttiµ di††heva dhamme abhiññå sacchikatvå 
upasampajja vihareyyanti – tatra tatreva sakkhibhabbataµ påpuˆissasi, sati 
satiåyatane ti. 
  The Blind Arhat and the Old Baby: Liberation by Wisdom, … 45 
 And in another discourse from the Majjhima-nikåya, the 
Mahåvedalla-sutta, calm and insight meditation are listed together 
in a five-fold set of factors connected to the cultivation of right 
view. 37  The question arises: “how many conditions give rise to 
right view?” The answer is that there are two conditions: the voice 
of another (parato ghosa) and focused attention (yoniso 
manasikåra). The next question concerns how many conditions 
support right view in bringing about the liberation of/by mind and 
the liberation by/of wisdom. The answer given is that there are five 
conditions: moral virtue (s¥la), learning (suta), dialogue (såkaccha), 
calm (samatha), and insight (vipassanå). In this way, the 
cultivation of calm and insight meditation are again placed on a 
continuum of practices alongside the cultivation of moral habits, 
learning, and dialogue, and with listening to the words of the 
teacher and focused attention as the basis. Here, right view is not 
the goal, but the basis for achieving liberation of/by mind and 
liberation by/of wisdom. 
 One could cite other similar passages, but I want to turn 
instead to a narrative in which calm and insight meditation are 
presented together as a combined or complementary set of 
practices. It is the story of Sthavira or Sthaviraka, whom I call Old 
Baby. Structurally and thematically, it is quite similar to the 
Cakkhupåla story, though it comes from a different Buddhist 
textual tradition: the narrative tradition represented by the Avadåna- 
ßataka, The Hundred Buddhist Tales, a collection of stories that 
may bear a close relationship to the M¨lasarvåstivåda-vinaya and 
the Divyåvadåna, and which has been linked by various scholars to 
the Sarvåstivåda tradition.38 Like Cakkhupåla, Sthavira becomes an 
arhat while overcoming or experiencing the effects of both negative 
and positive actions committed in prior lifetimes. As in the 
Cakkhupåla story, the story of Sthavira includes a narrative of the 
past in which the Buddha explains the past actions that led to the 
specific circumstances of Sthavira’s final lifetime. Both stories also 
feature old men who become monks and practice intensively over 
the course of a rainy season retreat before finally becoming arhats. 
                                                           
37  For an English translation, see Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 390. In the PTS 
edition, it is vol. 1, p. 294. 
38  The Sanskrit edition of this text is found in Speyer 1902-1909, vol. 2, part 2: 
133-146. On the intertextual relationships and school affiliation, see, for 
instance, Hartmann 1985. 
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In a number of respects, the story of Sthavira is a strange 
tale, and since it is not yet readily available in translation, apart 
from the old French translation in Feer (1891), I want to give a 
sense for the whole story. It opens with the common motif of a 
wealthy merchant, who marries a suitable woman, and they 
conceive a child, but the story then quickly enters the realm of the 
uncanny when the couple’s first child stays in his mother’s belly 
for sixty years. Meanwhile, the woman gives birth to ten sons. 
Eventually she becomes ill, and on her deathbed she informs her 
husband that she is still carrying their first child in her belly. She 
asks him to remove the boy when she dies. After the woman dies, 
J¥vaka, the king of physicians, is summoned to the cremation 
ground to cut open the dead woman’s belly and take out the child. 
A voice from the heavens is also heard in town, announcing what is 
going to happen, and people become curious. Many of them gather 
at the cremation ground; the six rival teachers also join the crowd, 
and the Buddha invites his monks to come and witness the event as 
well, saying, “If any of you wants to see strange and unprecedented 
events, come with me” (yo ’dbhutåni draΣ†ukåµa˙ sa ågacchatu).  
When the Buddha arrives with his entourage of monks, the crowd 
makes way for them. 
Once everyone has arrived, J¥vaka cuts open the dead 
woman’s belly, and out steps a small, withered old man, about 
sixty years old, who immediately announces to the crowd: 
Honored Ones, do not speak harsh words about your gurus 
or those who act on behalf of your gurus, or about your 
mothers and fathers, or about your teachers and preceptors. 
Do not experience a similar kind of situation to me: 
remaining for sixty years amidst the stomach and 
intestines.39 
After saying these words, he falls silent, at which point the Buddha 
engages him in a brief dialogue playing on the word, sthavira, 
which means “old man,” but also “distinguished elder” or “senior 
monk.” In their dialogue, the Buddha seems to acknowledge the 
old boy’s status and that this will be his final lifetime: “Young man, 
you are an old man, an elder” (sthavirako ’si dåraka), he says; and 
                                                           
39  Speyer 1902-1909, 135: må bhavanto guruΣu garusthånīyeΣu 
måtåpitṛΣvåcåryopadhyåyeΣu kharåµ våcaµ niścårayata må haivaµvidhåm 
avasthåm anubhaviΣyatha | yad aham åmåśayapakvåśayayor madhye ΣaΣ†i 
varΣåˆyuΣita˙. 
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the old boy responds accordingly, “Yes, I am an old man 
(sthavirako ’ham).” This is said to be the origin of the protagonist’s 
name, an element many stories in the Avadånaßataka seek to 
explain, and another narrative feature the story shares with the 
Cakkhupåla story.  
After his conversation with Sthavira, the Buddha gives 
everyone a sermon, and while many people are greatly edified by it, 
Sthavira attains no great achievement from it. Apparently he must 
develop more slowly. He lives for ten more years as a householder 
before finally becoming a monk. When he does so at the age of 
seventy, he spends the rainy season retreat in a group of twenty-
five monks. The community’s elder monk, not the same person as 
Sthavira, urges everyone to achieve the noble path by the end of 
the retreat: “Let none of you go on practicing this path as a 
common ordinary being” (na kenacit p®thagjanena 
pracårayitavyaµ), he says. They all practice intensively, and by the 
end of the retreat, all of them have become arhats; only Sthavira 
remains an ordinary person.  
So, the elder admonishes him and expels him from the 
community of practitioners. At this point, the story becomes quite 
poignant. Sthavira takes a knife and goes into his hut, intending to 
end his own life. There, he composes a series of quite beautiful 
verses expressing his world-weariness and despair through a series 
of nature images, such as the following: 
The entire forest is alight; the hill has become reddish gold.  
Yet even today this wretched mind is not freed. 
 
The sound of the mountain stream has gone quiet;  
The flowing waters have become a trickle;  
Yet even today this wretched mind is not freed.40 
The Buddha, of course, perceives Sthavira’s distress from afar, and 
immediately fixes his attention upon the old monk. He uses his 
superhuman powers to go and see him, and gives him another 
                                                           
40  Speyer 1902-1909, 136-137: ådīptaµ kånanaµ sarvaµ parvatå˙ kapilīkṛtå | 
athedaµ påpakaµ cittamadyapi na vimucyate || śåntå girinadīśabdå˙ 
parīttasalilodakå˙ | athedaµ påpakaµ cittamadyapi na vimucyate. The 
reading of parvatå˙ kapilīkṛtå in the second pada of the first verse was 
suggested by F. W. Thomas, based on the Tibetan, and given Speyer’s 
approval in a note in the addenda for which see page cxii of the preface. 
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teaching on the Dharma of such a kind that, when Sthavira hears 
it, he immediately realizes the state of an arhat. 
 When he becomes an arhat, Sthavira then surveys the world 
with his divine eye, looking for others he can train in the Dharma, 
an act that clearly mirrors the Buddha’s own enlightened behavior. 
Sthavira perceives a group of five hundred merchants who are 
beset by a strong hurricane. With his superhuman powers, he goes 
and saves them. The merchants thereby gain faith in him and 
decide to become his followers. Sthavira then gives them, the story 
appears to say, a teaching on mental concentration or focused 
attention (manasikåra), and after a short while, all of them become 
arhats as well.  
Here is the point at which the story first mentions calm 
(ßamatha) and insight meditation (vipaßyanå). The group of six 
monks begins to question whether Sthavira and his five hundred 
followers really are arhats. It is apparent why this might be so. The 
monks are disconnected from the larger community and no one has 
yet tested their virtues. So, Ónanda goes to interview Sthavira and 
his five hundred followers in order to test their understanding. He 
first asks Sthavira: “Upon what things should a monk who has 
gone to live in the forest, at the foot of a tree, or in an empty 
village, maintain constant mental concentration (katame 
dharmåbh¥kΣˆaµ manasikartavyå˙)?” 
Sthavira readily answers, “A monk who has gone to live in 
the forest, at the foot of a tree, or in an empty village, should 
maintain constant mental concentration on two things: calm 
(ßamatha) and insight (vipaßyanå).” Ónanda then asks about the 
benefits of the persistent practice of calm and insight meditation, 
respectively: “When one has persistently practiced calm, cultivated 
calm, and frequently attained calm, what benefit will one 
experience? When one has persistently practiced insight, cultivated 
insight, and frequently attained insight, what benefit will one 
experience?” Sthavira answers,  
When one has persistently practiced calm, cultivated calm, 
and frequently attained calm, then, achieving insight, one is 
freed. When one has persistently practiced insight, cultivated 
insight, and frequently attained insight, then, achieving calm, 
one is freed. Venerable Ónanda, when a noble disciple has 
learned and become completely saturated with calm and 
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insight, then his mind is freed with regard to his mental 
disposition.41  
Here, Sthavira’s answer suggests that calm and insight work 
together to generate the practitioner’s freedom of mind. 
Grammatically, the passage conveys this point with the use of 
parallel gerund constructions: When one has persistently practiced 
ßamatha, then, on account of (or having mastered) insight 
(vipaßyanåm ågamya), one is freed; when one has persistently 
practiced insight, then, on account of (or having mastered) calm 
(ßamatham ågamya), one is freed. Not only that, calm and insight 
are presented here as being on the same level; one is not more or 
less important than the other; they work together. 
Ónanda goes on to inquire about the nature of mental 
disposition in this context, and Sthavira tells him that the mental 
disposition in question refers to annihilation, dispassion, and 
cessation (nirodha), each of them specifically regarding the latent 
tendencies or conditioning factors of existence (saµskåra). So, to 
synthesize Sthavira’s message, one might say that the state of 
mental freedom, which is generated through the combined practice 
of calm and insight meditation, entails the understanding that 
whatever arises through conditioning factors will be annihilated, 
the cultivation of dispassion toward whatever arises through 
conditioning factors, and ultimately the cessation of whatever 
arises through conditioning factors. This would seem to be the 
extent of Sthavira’s teaching on mental concentration.  
Ónanda is satisfied with Sthavira’s answers, and he 
proceeds to interview the five hundred followers. He asks the same 
questions and receives precisely the same answers. He finally 
returns to see the Buddha, and he asks him the same questions and 
again receives the same answers. Ónanda then expresses his 
wonderment at the fact that he has independently received the very 
same answers to his questions from both Sthavira and his five 
hundred followers, as well as from the Buddha himself. The 
Buddha then asks him what he has determined about the situation, 
and Ónanda confirms that Sthavira and his five hundred followers 
                                                           
41  Speyer 1902-1909, 140: śamatha åyuΣmann ånanda åsevito bhåvito 
bahulīkṛto vipaśyanåm ågamya vimucyate; vipaśyanå åsevitå bhåvitå 
bahulīkṛtå śamatham ågamya vimucyate (vimucyante?). Íamathavipaśyanå-
paribhåvitam åyuΣmann ånanda śrutavata åryaśråvakasya cittaµ dhåtuśo 
vimucyate. 
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are arhats. In this way, the story tells us, the Buddha and Ónanda 
are able to demonstrate the virtues of Sthavira and his five hundred 
followers in the face of the skepticism voiced by a group of monks. 
At this point, the monks who have been listening to the 
story, and who serve as the model for its ideal audience, ask what 
prior actions Sthavira performed in his past lives to have stayed for 
sixty years in his mother’s belly, and which led him to develop so 
slowly, so very slowly, in his final lifetime, while at the same time 
achieving the state of an arhat. The Buddha explains that Sthavira 
had been a junior monk in a past life, during the time of the past 
Buddha Kaßyapa, and out of greediness for food, he had committed 
a harsh speech act toward his teacher, who was an arhat. Yet, 
through recitation and study, he also achieved mastery of the 
Buddha’s teachings on the five aggregates, the twelve-fold chain of 
dependent arising, and the nature of the possible and the impossible. 
This caused him to become a monk again in his final lifetime, and 
by annihilating all the afflictions, he achieved the state of an arhat. 
Within the present context, we may note the story’s 
emphasis on recitation, study, and insight through hearing the 
teachings, despite the fact that the content of the main teaching 
concerns the pairing of calm and insight meditation practice. The 
past-life story emphasizes this point, and it also can be seen in the 
way the story underlines the legitimacy of Sthavira’s attainment 
through a test of his understanding of what might be considered a 
doctrinal point, but also a point of theory and practice. In this case, 
the fact that the students repeat the same answers as Sthavira and 
the Buddha then answers in the same way serves to demonstrate 
that Sthavira and his students are “learned” (ßrutavat). This is a 
legitimating technique of a particular kind, and a similar instance 
of this same technique is found in a passage in the Påli Saµyutta-
nikåya in which Vacchagotta responds with wonderment to the fact 
that he independently receives the same answer to his questions 
from both Moggallåna the Great and the Buddha.42 In the case of 
the Sthavira story, the efficacy of the teaching is further indicated 
by the fact that the Buddha’s sermon is what finally facilitates 
                                                           
42  For an English translation of the whole passage, see Bodhi 2000: 1390-1392. 
My appreciation goes to Eviatar Shulman for his presentation at the 
workshop, which drew my attention to this passage and its rhetorical device. 
I also understand it to be found in many other contexts in the Påli texts, as 
well. 
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Sthavira’s awakening. Sthavira clearly possesses superhuman 
powers and extraordinary knowledge, and thus he cannot be 
described as “liberated by wisdom” in the same sense we find 
elsewhere, as someone lacking these sorts of powers and 
knowledge. Yet, maybe to a greater degree even than the story of 
Cakkhupåla, the story of Sthavira demonstrates the power and 
efficacy of wisdom or insight at certain key points along a gradual 
path of development with many highs and lows along the way. At 
the same time, the specific doctrinal understanding, or more 
accurately, the actual exhibition or demonstration of insight in the 
story, the doctrinal content of which centers specifically on the 
combination of calm and insight, also reflects and serves to 
legitimate a particular practitioner’s level of attainment. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
The essay began by raising a set of broad, long-standing, 
and intractable questions in Buddhist Studies concerning the 
relationship between calm and insight meditation, an issue that has 
various doctrinal, conceptual, theoretical, practical, and historical 
dimensions. Rather than engaging directly with these questions, 
however, I proposed to address a slightly different set of questions, 
focused on the following: What narratives feature characters who 
are specifically described as being either “liberated by wisdom” or 
a “dry-insight practitioner”? What can these narratives tell us about 
how some ancient Buddhists conceived the relationship between 
calm and insight meditation? How are teachings about the 
relationship between calm and insight meditation portrayed or 
conveyed in specific narrative contexts? And how does the 
teaching in such narrative contexts compare to other teachings on 
the relationship between calm and insight found in other Buddhist 
dialogues? We explored these questions mainly by focusing on two 
stories, one in Påli and the other in Sanskrit, supplemented by a 
few other narratives and dialogues, some quite well-known, like 
the Sus¥ma-sutta. Now in the conclusion we may consider briefly 
what these narratives and dialogues can reveal about some of the 
intractable questions. 
 One of the questions is whether the mysterious figure of the 
arhat “liberated by wisdom” or the so-called “dry-insight 
practitioner” justifies the historical argument made by scholars like 
La Vallée Poussin, Gombrich, and others that some Buddhists have 
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claimed that one can achieve awakening without any meditative 
insight whatsoever, but only through the study of Buddhist texts or 
some other kind of theoretical or intellectual insight into the truth. 
The narrative evidence considered here does not support this claim, 
at least not straightforwardly. Instead, the picture of the dry-insight 
practitioner and his practice that we receive from the story of 
Cakkhupåla in the Dhammapada commentary is very far, indeed, 
from the one we sometimes find in the modern scholarship on this 
topic, where the dry-insight practitioner is described as someone 
who possesses “a sterile and desiccated intellectuality”.43 In this 
story at least, the responsibility or vocation for practicing insight 
meditation appears to encompass or represent an entire ascetic 
lifestyle; it does not seem to be code for some sort of intellectualist 
approach to awakening. Asceticism, not intellectualism, more aptly 
characterizes Cakkhupåla’s practice, which also appears to include 
some kind of meditation. Thus, one conclusion to be drawn from 
the present analysis is cautionary: we need to be careful about 
distinguishing descriptions of particular meditative states or 
categories of soteriological achievement from descriptions of 
specific techniques by which such states may be achieved. 
Speaking of such techniques, perhaps the idea of “liberation 
through wisdom” was sometimes meant to describe certain 
narrative contexts in which a dialogue with the Buddha could itself 
be liberating,44 but what of the contrast between textual study and 
meditation practice? While the story of Cakkhupåla does contrast 
meditation practice, broadly construed, with a vocation dedicated 
to the mastery of Buddhist texts, it does so, arguably, not to 
suggest opposing approaches to the path or competing conceptions 
of the goal. It does not tell us how the two responsibilities of the 
Buddhist monk are meant to connect to one other. Rather, the 
dichotomy between textual study and insight meditation provides a 
narrative framework for contextualizing the overarching ascetic 
lifestyle that Cakkhupåla chooses. With respect to choice of 
lifestyle, the Cakkhupåla story is actually quite similar to the story 
of Sthavira in the Avadånaßataka. Both stories feature monks who 
enter the monastic order late in life, and they both become arhats at 
                                                           
43 This description is found in Griffiths 1981: 608. 
44  In this regard, it may be fruitful to consider these examples in light of 
Masefield (1986), which provides a larger framework for thinking about 
episodes in which hearing a sermon from the Buddha is efficacious. 
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the end of relatively short periods of intensive practice. They 
undertake their ascetic practices (including meditation) in the 
“border regions,” conceived as the ideal site for such practice. They 
both concentrate on their practice during the rainy season retreat, 
again, the ideal timeframe for such practices. So, the monks’ ages 
and the duration and intensity of their practices dovetail with their 
choice of an ascetic lifestyle and an explicit focus on achieving 
awakening in their present lifetime. 
In other ways, however, Cakkhupåla does share certain 
characteristics seemingly associated with the arhat liberated by 
wisdom. In the Sus¥ma-sutta and in the story of P¨rˆa from the 
Divyåvadåna, the arhat liberated by wisdom is someone who has 
achieved awakening, but not certain specific types of extraordinary 
knowledge or powers. In the case of the latter, P¨rˆa develops such 
powers at a moment’s notice through an intense application of 
vigor, but the initial depiction of him still supports the 
characterization of the arhat liberated by wisdom as someone who 
does not possess certain types of extraordinary knowledge and 
powers. While the development of superhuman powers are not 
really made an explicit focus or theme in the story of Cakkhupåla, 
it is key to the plot that he becomes blind and that his powers thus 
remain limited, even after he becomes an arhat. He becomes an 
arhat still, and his knowledge of the young monk’s moral character 
and behavior indicates this fact, but he nonetheless remains limited 
or constrained, particularly by the power of his past actions, which 
condition his present-life circumstances, choices, and achievements. 
Nevertheless, the point to emphasize here is that the stories do 
seem to say something about the qualities or powers (or the lack 
thereof) possessed by the arhat who is described as being either 
liberated by wisdom or a dry-insight practitioner. 
Even though the story of Cakkhupåla does contain a 
dichotomy between the vocation of textual study and the vocation 
of meditation, however, it does not align this dichotomy with the 
one between calm and insight. By the same token, the story of 
Sthavira does not present its teaching about the connection between 
calm and insight as an alternative to some other teaching in which 
they are differentiated or opposed, or associated with differing or 
opposing lifestyles or practices. Sthavira is not called an arhat 
liberated by wisdom; neither is he called a dry-insight practitioner, 
nor is there any contrast presented in the story between meditation 
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or ascetic practice and textual study. Instead, specific doctrinal or 
propositional insights appear to reflect and legitimize specific 
achievements in practice. Despite the content of its teaching about 
the interdependence of calm and insight, the story arguably 
contains more on the transformative potential of learning or 
receiving the teachings than it does on the efficacy of intensive 
meditation practice. The demonstration of a point of doctrine 
becomes the measure of Sthavira’s attainment, and the past-life 
portion of the story confirms the positive impact of past study and 
recitation of texts. Like Cakkhupåla, however, Sthavira is both 
constrained and enabled by the power of his past actions, which 
partly leads to his achievement of extraordinary knowledge and 
superhuman powers. This thematic similarity between the two 
stories is built into their basic narrative structures, and thus it calls 
for a specifically narrative analysis; but again, the point to 
recognize here is that the stories actually muddle the picture by 
challenging the clean parallels that have been proposed between 
calm and insight, on the one hand, and meditation practice and 
textual study, on the other. 
Consequently, I remain doubtful that either of these stories 
makes a general claim about the relative or combined value of 
calm or insight in the context of some larger doctrinal discussion. 
They are not clear statements of systematic Buddhist doctrine. 
Instead, they are stories, and as stories, they speak to us in a 
narrative mode that is quite distinct from the more paradigmatic 
mode of the systematic treatises and many of the dialogues. For 
this reason, the stories allow us to think in a different way about 
categories like the arhat who is liberated by wisdom or the dry-
insight practitioner, or “doctrinal” statements about the relationship 
between calm and insight meditation. They become characters and 
teachings (or practices) in a story, rather than decontextualized sets 
of propositions to be deduced and understood. Now, at the same 
time, there has also been a tendency to read these old stories as 
historical accounts of one kind or another. Certainly, as Hayden 
White (1987) observed, history is often articulated in the narrative 
mode, but as Steven Collins (2013: 57) has noted, “In any place and 
time it is difficult clearly to delineate when a narrative text is a 
‘history’ or a ‘story’.”45 Thus, we must exercise caution before we 
                                                           
45 Abbott 2008 calls the distinction between “fiction” and “nonfiction” one that 
is made “top-down,” whereas the distinction between “narrative” and “non-
  The Blind Arhat and the Old Baby: Liberation by Wisdom, … 55 
find evidence in these stories for our histories of Buddhism, 
complete with larger master narratives governed by dichotomies of 
our own making, because the stories do not provide us with 
straightforward historical information either. They reflect lived 
worlds of nature and social norms and institutions, but these 
remain imagined and ideal worlds. The stories create these worlds 
within and through the narrative, and they prompt the reader to 
understand them as the real world, our world, which we can then 
imagine as a world of meaning and meaningful action, but also one 
(like ours) containing certain ambiguities and tensions. 
So, on the intractable questions concerning the relationship 
between calm and insight, we are still at the stage of collecting 
relevant data, and this essay has added a couple of new data points 
to the conversation. As we take stock of what we have learned, 
several points can be made. First, we should become more 
sensitive to the way texts sometimes slide from claims about 
particular states of being or attainment, to claims about certain 
types of person and their qualities, to claims about how people can 
achieve such states or qualities. We should also try to separate 
doctrinal, theoretical, exegetical, or pedagogical claims made in or 
about specific Buddhist works from historical claims concerning 
specific times and places. And we also need to disambiguate a 
number of different oppositions or dichotomies that have 
sometimes been conflated. For instance, calm and insight are not 
the same as meditation and textual study, or practice and theory. At 
the same time, since textual knowledge is also a type of practice, 
we should be careful about unreflectively projecting our own 
dichotomies about practice and theory onto Buddhism. Again, it 
matters what one means by calm, insight, meditation, and 
liberation; we need to revisit these terms and their relationships 
from fresh perspectives. In a variegated tradition, ambiguities and 
tensions will always give rise to outliers and alternative viewpoints, 
but I think we might reasonably move forward with the hypothesis 
that calm and insight (and perhaps even meditation practice and 
                                                                                                                                  
narrative” is a “bottom-up” determination (148). In general, Abbott’s work 
is a valuable resource for those who might wish to think more about the 
techniques and implications of a narrative approach to Buddhist literature, 
although both nonwestern literary traditions and religious narratives in 
general are woefully under-represented in his discussion. For a 
philosophical take on the question of religious narratives and their truth-
value, see Comstock 1993. 
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textual study) are more typically seen along a continuum of related 
practices of self-transformation, rather than in opposition as 
competing forms of life or practice.46  
Even still, I mean for this general claim to apply most 
especially within the multivocal and pluralistic world of the 
Buddhist textual imagination, the one constructed by and reflected 
in the textual works Buddhists themselves produced. Whether and 
how the stories of Cakkhupåla and Sthavira reflect specific 
historical realities or clear doctrinal stances are questions that will 
remain open for debate. Each narrative deserves its own close 
reading, but as we have seen, oftentimes under scrutiny the 
meaning of the story begins to wriggle and slip through our grasp, 
defying the attempt to pin down some type of general interpretation 
                                                           
46  See also Fiordalis 2018, where I’ve proposed a similar hypothesis, but rather 
than narratives, there I look at a rather different type of Buddhist text: the 
systematic work, instantiated principally by the AbhidharmakośabhåΣya. 
Whether it concerns the three practices of wisdom (learning, reasoning, and 
cultivation), which provide the focus for that paper, or the pairing of calm 
and insight, which has been our main focus here, the idea of seeing such 
practices on a continuum does not necessarily militate against the 
establishment of possible hierarchies between or among them. In this regard, 
it might be useful to reconsider Louis Dumont’s famous, but also 
controversial, concept of “hierarchical opposition,” which he used to 
describe the structure of the Indian caste system, and which he contrasted 
with the concept of binary, or what he called “complementary,” opposition. 
On Dumont’s notion of hierarchical opposition and its reception, see Hage, 
Harary, and Milicic 1995.  
   In the present context, the concepts of the arhat liberated by wisdom 
and the dry-insight practitioner are sometimes deployed in contexts that 
might be taken to convey a sense of hierarchy. For instance, according to the 
story of the first council found in the introductory section of the Påli 
commentary on the Dīgha-nikåya, Buddhaghosa indicates that Mahåkåssapa 
excluded an anonymous group of dry-insight practitioners from the first 
council or seated them at the outer fringes of the council alongside 
anonymous groups of stream-winners, once-returners, and non-returners, 
and other types of person. For the whole passage, see Rhys Davids and 
Carpenter 1886: 4. My appreciation goes to Anthony Scott for reminding 
me of this passage and encouraging my thinking in this regard. One might 
compare this example with the relative place of arhats liberated by wisdom 
in the lists of types of person cited in note 12 above. It would be interesting 
to consider on a case-by-case basis the question of whether hierarchy or the 
lack of hierarchy is suggested by various other narrative contexts. The 
passage described above is also mentioned in Wen 2009: 171-172; he 
connects it and a few other passages in the commentaries to issues related to 
the gradual disappearance of the Buddha’s dispensation from the world. 
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or comparison, either historical or doctrinal. Perhaps that is part of 
their point – as stories, they can explore ambiguities and tensions 
without necessarily resolving them – but as a final remark it 
remains noteworthy that both stories are set within an imagined 
world of what we might wish to call Buddhist asceticism. The 
narratives locate Buddhist practices of calm and insight firmly 
within this world. Expected and certainly idealized, this world 
consists of communities of practitioners and seemingly reflects 
their concerns. This may be an obvious point, but I think it bears 
emphasizing, because it points to the narrative context for what 
may be a connected theme: the stories reflect the tension 
sometimes apparent in Buddhist literature between a longer path of 
spiritual development and the possibility of quicker or more 
dramatic periods of change or attainment. Both stories place these 
quicker, more intensive paths within a much longer narrative 
framework of meaningful actions and their effects across many 
lifetimes. Indeed, in this respect, both stories are quite typical of 
many other Buddhist narratives insofar as they illustrate the power 
of past actions to condition present circumstances. Consequently, 
they are exemplary tales that tell us that our own actions are 
meaningful, and they also suggest that the Buddhist path in all its 
variety and diversity is an effective means of finding our own 
fulfillment. Therein lies the power of narrative. 
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